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Geoffrey K. Pullum 
Theory, Data, and the Epistemology of Syntax 
 
Abstract   Syntactic theory has tended to vacillate between implausible methodological extremes. Some 
linguists hold that our theories are accountable solely for the corpus of attested utterances; others assume 
our subject matter is unobservable intuitive feelings about sentences. Both extremes should be rejected. 
The subject matter of syntax is neither past utterance production nor the functioning of inaccessible mental 
machinery; it is normative — a system of tacitly grasped constraints defining correctness of structure. 
There are interesting parallels between syntactic and moral systems, modulo the key difference that 
linguistic systems are diverse whereas morality is universal. The appropriate epistemology for justifying 
formulations of normative systems is familiar in philosophy: it is known as the method of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 
The tendency for the study of language to swing between opposed extreme positions is 
very familiar to those who have followed the subject for a while. 
Second-language teaching, for example, has swung between communication-free 
structure-drilling and explanation-free whole-language immersion — between treating 
the language as dead and treating the students as babies. And in developmental linguistics 
we have seen both the radical empiricist view that all knowledge arises out of sensory 
experience through common-sense reasoning and nothing is innate, and the nativist claim 
that an innate grammar-building mental organ equips infants to acquire language with 
essentially no ‘learning’ at all (the rise of statistical approaches in the last two decades is 
a reaction to the latter, and a sign of the pendulum swinging back again). 
Similarly, in comparative syntactic theory the austere structuralist doctrine that 
languages could “differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways” yielded 
to the heady optimism of universals-hunting in 60s, and ultimately to absurdities like Neil 
Smith’s remark that Noam Chomsky has “shown that there is really only one human 
language” (1991:1; Chomsky never actually said any such thing). A reaction to this led to 
the new parochialism seen in Evans & Levinson (2009). 
In methodological matters, which will be my concern here, the extremes have been 
the data-fixated view that I will call corpus fetishism and the self-deluding reflection on 
one’s own idiolect that I will call intuitional solipsism. 
W. S. Allen’s statement in 1957 of the way linguists work was that “the linguist’s 
gospel comprises every word that proceeds from his informant’s mouth—which cannot, 
by definition, be wrong”, whereas “as a matter of principle, whatever the informant 
volunteers about his language (as opposed to in it) must be assumed to be wrong” 
(Strevens 1966: 18–19). 
Halliday (1966) wrote in broadly similar terms of how “The linguist[’s] … object 
of observation is the text: he describes language and relates it to the situations in which it 
is operating. Thoughts do not figure in the process since we cannot describe them.” 
In a review of Halliday, Postal (1969:412) asked what could be the point of “this 
preposterous methodology, … this philosophy which is not and cannot be followed.” In 
Postal’s hands and those of many other generative grammarians, however, linguistics 
turned toward a strange meditative intuition-seeking that all but severed its connection to 
empirical facts. Epistemological solipsism claims that although I know I exist and have a 
mind, I can never be sure about you. The intuition-centred syntactician says “This 
sentence is grammatical for me, but I can never be sure about whether it is for you.” 
The implication is that languages can never be shared or public or external. And 
that is surely absurd: to say that we have no access to the language spoken by Angela 
Merkel just isn’t true; to say that the Institut für Deutsche Sprache has no subject matter 
except certain internal and individual systems of mental representation is perverse. 
Corpus fetishism is related to the position that on Language Log I have called the 
‘everything-is-correct’ stance.1 It echoes Allen’s position that everything the native 
speaker utters is “by definition” correct. Sometimes it is allied to the view that 
nonstandard dialects are not even to be recognized as distinct from the standard: they are 
to be accepted and defended and submitted only to the criterion of intelligibility within 
their community. 
But an opposing view that I call the ‘nothing-is-relevant’ stance is also often 
encountered among the nonlinguistic public. There are people who seem to believe that 
no evidence is or could be relevant to revision of the rules of grammar. They are not 
intuitional solipsists, though, because they appear to have no faith whatever in their own 
intuitions. 
For example, it has been alleged in some usage guides that pronouns may not take a 
genitive noun phrase as antecedent: thus Einstein’s theories made him world famous 
would be judged a grammatical mistake. Arnold Zwicky reported (in a Language Log 
post on 8 October 2003.2 
When a colleague posted to the newsgroup sci.lang that possessive antecedents were just 
ungrammatical, and I mailed him an example from his own writing, he was inclined to think 
that he should just be more vigilant. 
Zwicky encountered the attitude again when he took half a dozen examples of genitive 
antecedents from the works of Louis Menand, who had endorsed the supposed rule, and 
sent them to the author. The reply was simply that the arbitrariness of a rule, and the 
difficulty of always obeying it, should not mean that we should give up the attempt. 
Simon Heffer (2010:xviii) provides another clear example of ‘nothing-is-relevant’ 
thinking, when he says: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/001843.html	  2 See http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/ myl/languagelog/archives/000030.html	  
As a professional writer, I happen to believe that the ‘evidence’ of how I see English written 
by others, including some other professional writers, is not something by which I wish to be 
influenced…because in some degree it is, by the codified usage that seems sensible to me, 
wrong. 
The wrongness of which Heffer speaks consists in “the choice of the wrong word; the use 
of faulty grammatical constructions; and an absence of logic.” But not an absence of 
evidence, it would seem. 
The ‘nothing-is-relevant’ stance is sometimes presented in the guise of modesty: 
my own writing may be imperfect, the writer confesses, but if even I make mistakes, that 
only means that we should all try harder. George Orwell (1946), for example, says almost 
exactly this: 
Look back through this essay, and for certain you will find that I have again and again 
committed the very faults I am protesting against. 
The very rules he himself advocates are by his own admission impossible for him to 
follow. Such is the irrationality of the ‘nothing-is-relevant’ camp. 
On the other side, corpus linguistics based on huge corpora has been gaining 
popularity as a methodology for syntax. But it will fail to have the effect it should on 
theoretical linguistics if its adherents fall into the extreme ‘everything-is-correct’ trap. 
When faced with corpus evidence, intuitional solipsists tend to defend themselves by 
insisting that there are performance errors in all corpora, so one cannot trust them; 
moreover, the idea of pure, cleaned-up, error-free corpora gives the game away by 
admitting that intuition is needed, for once one admits intuitional evidence, the corpus 
has no further role and its testimony can be ignored. That is an unfortunately extreme 
position. 
But so is treating the corpus as if it were the object of study, rather than just an 
imperfect and highly incomplete reflection of a small finite sample of the results of using 
the object of study. What, for example, is the point of the tendency seen in some 
grammars of the last ten years toward using corpus-derived examples for illustration? 
Why is it that some grammarians seem to think that every example in a reference 
grammar should come from a corpus? It seems to me it is not even generally desirable, let 
alone fully feasible. Neither the Quirk-Greenbaum-Leech-Svartvik Comprehensive 
Grammar (Quirk et al. 1985) nor CGEL pursues such a policy. When CGEL illustrates 
clause type (p. 853), it does it with invented sentences that are parallel in all but clause 
type: 
[1] Declarative   You are generous. 
 Imperative   Be generous. 
 Closed Interrogative Are you generous? 
 Open Interrogative How generous are you? 
 Exclamative  How generous you are! 
There would be no point in using corpus examples with citations instead; illustration 
should be distinguished from investigation. And anyway, there simply isn’t a sharp line 
dividing intuition-guided editing of attested material from intuition-guided invention of 
new material. 
One reason for rejecting corpus fetishism is that the corpus is never large enough, 
and never can be, and is always skewed. Chomsky was right to note this. Even with 
gigantic corpora, frequency information is utterly flaky. According to the Web 1T 5-gram 
corpus produced by Google researchers, the most common 5-word sequence is send a 
private message to. It occurs 26,672,131 times.3 This is an utterly useless piece of 
information. This piece of boilerplate text on large numbers of related pages has no 
interest at all. The entire top 20, with the number of occurrences for each, is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
  send a private message to   26,672,131 
  property of their respective owners  25,640,531 
  this result in new window         24,059,811 
  the property of their respective  24,891,265 
  are the property of their   24,938,581 
  Open this result in new   24,059,963 
  site constitutes acceptance of the  21,556,427 
  brands are the property of   21,139,112 
  and brands are the property  21,113,548 
  trademarks and brands are the  20,975,334 
  User Agreement and Privacy Policy 20,917,050 
  Designated trademarks and brands are 20,820,815 
  this Web site constitutes acceptance 19,723,554 
  the eBay User Agreement and  19,808,132 
  of this Web site constitutes   19,703,371 
  of the eBay User Agreement  19,850,627 
  eBay User Agreement and Privacy  19,807,811 
  constitutes acceptance of the eBay  19,850,700 
  acceptance of the eBay User  19,850,253 
  Web site constitutes acceptance of  19,724,386 
Table 1: The top 20 most frequent 5-word sequences on the web 
 
What you get is still dominated by junk : bits of boilerplate from commercial websites 
such as the eBay terms of service; standard wording shared by millions of Facebook 
profiles; parts of frequently-used lists needed on many different kinds of page. 
As John Cowan commented on Language Log: “it seems a reasonably safe 
conjecture that ‘Trademarks and brands are the property of their respective owners’ is the 
most common sentence on the Web, and therefore probably the most common sentence 
of written English as a whole.” Indeed, it is doubtless the most frequently attested written 
sentence in the entire history of the English language. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 See http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1231	  
And things are no better if you move to rarer 5-grams that occur only a million 
times each (see Table 2). 
The take-home message is that in some ways actual frequency is almost as 
unrevealing and unimportant as Chomsky said it was. And it’s no good saying that a 
corpus needs to be more representative: the boring pieces of boilerplate above are 
representative, that’s the whole problem. What you mean is ‘representative of the sort of 
thing we want to pay attention to in studying the structure of English’. But that’s an 
intuition-guided concept! 
  ND OH OK OR PA     1,012,023 
  State University of New York   1,011,879 
  NY NC ND OH OK     1,011,482 
  Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech   1,011,221 
  browser does not support script   1,010,343 
  poster ’s website AIM Address   1,007,641 
  in TripAdvisor ’s popularity index   1,007,567 
  a great domain name at    1,007,579 
  Visit poster ’s website AIM    1,007,875 
  Get a great domain name    1,007,806 
  great domain name at eNom   1,006,715 
  d d d d d      1,006,434 
  See more of the brand    1,006,237 
  your web hosting at eNom    1,005,283 
  MD ME MI MN MO     1,005,327 
  Get your web hosting at    1,005,294 
  is the responsibility of the    1,003,710 
  NM NY NC ND OH     1,003,534 
  part of The New York    1,001,557 
  Shopping help About this site   1,001,307 
  Islands Faroe Islands Fiji Finland   1,001,073 
  Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Puerto 1,000,489 
  have not been able to 1,000,387 
Table 2: 5-word sequences attested a million times on the web 
 
Let me briefly describe a case study in which corpus methods failed me, at least 
initially. English allows phrases that appear to involve predicates in prenucleus function 
in concessive adjuncts headed by though, as in happy though I am. To get some sense of 
the frequency of this construction using an untagged corpus, I searched for though in the 
Wall Street Journal corpus and simply eyeballed the first thousand occurrences. (Actually 
I had to read 1,003 of them, because three of the tokens were not intended as tokens of 
the word I was searching for: they were typos for either thought or through. And I will 
have missed any cases where an intended though was misspelled as thogh or tough or 
whatever; I only looked at cases of the letter sequence though.) 
I found that of the sentences containing that letter sequence, numbers 225, 449, 
671, and 673 were instances of the construction I’m talking about. Here they are: 
[2] a. Skilled though they are, the Asbury-Olivers make mile-high mistakes, 
including his announcement of a coming AIRSOW. 
 b. While nobody currently expects these hearings to force President Reagan’s 
resignation, the investigation will show that administration officials 
conducted covert foreign-policy operations that, well-intentioned though they 
may have been, turned out to be confused, duplicitous failures. 
 c. My retirement income, modest though it may be, is based on dividends spread 
out over 12 utility companies for diversification protection. 
 d. Incredible though it may seem, sales of Japanese cars are falling as higher 
prices and increasing competition demystify their once-magical allure for 
Americans. 
Thus if my sample was representative for this genre, about 0.4 percent of the tokens of 
the correctly spelled tokens of though head instances of the construction. (Notice, this is 
essentially the same as the number of instances of though that were misspellings!) 
Now, as it happened, none of the four that I found involve an unbounded dependency 
crossing a finite clause boundary. The predicate gap is always a complement of the verb 
be, which may be (a) the main clause verb or (b) in the catenative complement of an 
auxiliary verb, or (c) in the catenative complement of a non-auxiliary verb, or (d) in the 
catenative complement of the catenative complement of an auxiliary verb: 
[3] a. [PP	  skilled PP	  though Clause	  they are ___ 
 b. [PP	  modest PP	  though Clause	  it may be ___ 
 c. [PP	  incredible PP	  though Clause	  it may seem ___ 
 d. [PP	  well-intentioned PP	  though Clause	  they may have been ___ 
So this does not tell us whether the gap can be embedded inside a content-clause 
complement, as in this invented example (here Fin marks the finite complement clauses): 
[4] Well-intentioned though Clause	  many people may have imagined[Clause	  the CIA 
probably thought Clause	  they were ___, their foreign-policy operations were 
confused, duplicitous failures. 
I thought then, and think now, that this is probably grammatical. But how could I find 
corpus support for this belief? 
I let other linguists know that I wanted to find an example showing that this construction 
permitted nonlocal subordinate-clause gaps. But it was not until some eleven months later 
that Chris Potts happened to spot an example at the bottom of page 13 of James Gleick’s 
Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman (Vintage Books): 
[5] Although he sometimes retreated to a stance of pure practicality, Feynman 
gave answers to these questions, PP philosophical and unscientific [PP though 
[Clause he knew [Clause they were ___ ] ]. 
So there was at least one attested case in print. And it was in a book that I had on my own 
shelves, and had read! 
Could such a case have been found in a balanced corpus? Ten years ago, it would 
have been doubtful. But things have been improving at a rapid rate: larger corpora are 
appearing, and many are quite accurately tagged. On hearing about my quest in 2009, 
Mark Davies (the creator of COCA and other BYU corpora) ran a search on the 400 
million tagged words of COCA, speculating that this pattern might turn up some hits: 
[6] [j*] though [pp*] [v*] [pp*] [be] 
This asks for Adjective + though + Pronoun + Verb + Pronoun + any form of be. And 
indeed, with this pattern he picked up one example, from an article in American Scholar 
by Joseph Epstein; the crucial phrase was this: 
[7] Good though he knew it was, … 
That is enough to settle my question about whether the construction can have an 
unbounded dependency, provided we assume—a big but familiar syntactician’s 
assumption—that if the gap can be embedded in one finite subordinate clause it can be 
further embedded without limit. 
One advantage of corpus investigation that I have not seen mentioned by corpus 
linguists, though it strikes me as important, concerns serendipity: I find that whenever I 
search a corpus I always learn new things that I wasn’t initially looking for. One 
serendipitous thing I learned from the WSJ search mentioned above was that more than 
13% of the tokens of though in WSJ are in occurrences of even though. Notice that 
P even though Q has the same truth conditions as P though Q, and both have the same 
truth conditions as P and Q. The differences in meaning here are of the kind studied by 
Wilson (1973) and Potts (2005): they are not part of the at-issue truth-conditional content. 
The high frequency with which though is felt to need even before it is an indication of 
how important such aspects of semantics are in real natural language use. 
Large corpora, when available, are a crucially important tool. But you can’t always 
get them when trying to settle issues that depend on low-frequency combinations, so it is 
essential to pay attention to other modes of access to data as well. Those modes would 
include (i) happenstance—specific examples you just happen to come across anecdotally 
through good luck, or email, or Language Log, or a friend, or an elicitation session, or an 
odd experience; (ii) surveying the judgments of others; and (iii) consulting your own 
intuition. 
The latter source of data is of course beyond the pale for the true believer in corpus 
linguistics. Perhaps the most extreme among them is Geoffrey Sampson. His article 
‘Grammar without grammaticality’ Sampson (2007a) was published with commentaries, 
including mine Pullum (2007). Sampson replied (2007b), and since then has developed 
his thesis into a book (Sampson 2014), where the issue is thrashed out again (96–98). Let 
me pick up a couple of the things that Sampson said as part of his response, because they 
go to the heart of my conception of syntax and its methodology, yet are seldom debated, 
considered, or even understood by syntacticians. 
In my paper I suggested that “the epistemology of grammar involves something 
rather like what philosopher Nelson Goodman called the method of reflective 
equilibrium”, a method “familiar to philosophers from applications in subfields like logic, 
ethics, and political philosophy.” It involves a procedure of comparing considered 
judgments (about logical validity, moral correctness, political fairness, or whatever) with 
consequences of tentatively proposed principles or rules and associated theoretical 
considerations, iteratively revising as necessary to attain optimal coherence among them. 
I then added this remark: 
I take linguistics to have an inherently normative subject matter. The task of the syntactician 
is exact codification of a set of norms implicit in linguistic practice. (Pullum 2007:41] 
Later I remarked that philosophical discussions relating the normative to the natural in 
matters like ethics and aesthetics deserve linguists’ attention. Sampson’s response 
(2007b:112) was as follows: 
Having begun by condemning my thesis as “extraordinary” and one that will “give corpus 
linguistics a bad name”, Pullum proposes a view of grammatical research that departs far 
further than mine from the consensus. I was at least assuming that grammatical description 
consists of statements that are correct or incorrect: but correctness is not a concept applicable 
to the domains of ethics or aesthetics. (As it is often put in the case of ethics, “you cannot 
derive an ought from an is”.) 
It is baffling that Sampson imagines he can see a consensus for me to depart from, 
given the pendulum-swings between the corpus-bound and intuition-based approaches 
mentioned earlier. But traditional grammar was never about exact modelling of 
behaviour; it was about explaining what restrictions on linguistic behaviour one has to 
observe in order to be said to be using the language correctly. Grammars have always 
tacitly aimed to draw that line. 
The undesirable aspect of the generativist contribution to syntax is not that it 
delimits the grammatical from the ungrammatical, but that it does so by drawing a sharp 
line between the perfectly grammatical sentences that are generated and material with no 
linguistic properties at all (everything that is not generated). I have pointed out in Pullum 
(2013) that it is not necessary for an explicit grammar to draw such a sharp line: a 
grammar consisting of a finite set of separate constraints on structure can be interpreted 
as defining (in a number of different ways) a finely graded classification of degrees of 
ungrammaticality, because for each constraint a structure may satisfy it or violate it (at 
one or more points). For example, [8a] is well formed, but [8b] violates the subject-verb 
agreement constraint, and [8c] also violates the constraint that says progressive be takes a 
gerund-participial complement, and [8d] both violates those and additionally contravenes 
the constraint that determiners precede nominals, and thus is even further away from 
being grammatical. 
[8] a.    	  	  Are our children learning? 
 b.    *Is our children learning? 
 c.  **Is our children learn? 
 d. ***Is children our learn? 
The fact that some traditional grammars erred empirically by straying into prescriptivism 
is immaterial. Prescriptivism, which I have already discussed, has nothing to do with the 
normativity of the subject matter of grammar. It involves the imposition of one person’s 
style preferences and opinions about correctness on others, confusing colloquial usages or 
regionalisms with incorrectness, or pontificating about the constraints they would prefer 
language users to observe (as in the famous case of the Fowler brothers’ discussion of 
relative which (Fowler & Fowler 1906:000). But none of that is relevant. The task of 
descriptive work is to lay down standards of correctness—not standards we ought to 
aspire to, but the standards that we tacitly already live by. Grammarians have never been 
concerned with simply cataloguing and tabulating what has occurred in texts or 
conversations. Jespersen’s copious evidence from texts was there to illustrate that the 
patterns he found in well-formed expressions did occur in literature, which he assumed 
would almost always exemplify correct use of the language he was describing. 
On the more general philosophical point, Sampson is asserting a very specific 
minority view, anticognitivism, as if its truth were unquestionable. He thinks there is no 
such thing as truth in normative domains like morality: that any claim made in a domain 
like morality is false. Since moral reasoning relies on the existence of moral truths, there 
can be no moral reasoning for Sampson: he cannot say that Beating a man or a woman to 
death is wrong entails Beating a man to death is wrong, because entailment and other 
truth-related properties do not apply to moral claims. 
I have no space here to survey the huge philosophical literature on moral realism. 
Suffice it to say that study of that literature will convince you that there have been many 
defenses of the view that there are moral facts and that we can know them. Some of those 
views are non-naturalist, taking moral facts to be of a different sort than facts about the 
physical world that scientists investigate, but others assume naturalism, which means that 
they take science and philosophy to be parts of a seamless web in which neither is 
independent of the other. 
Moral realism seems to me quite plausible even in conjunction with naturalism. 
And it should be easier to see how normative facts about grammar might be justified than 
to see how normative facts about mathematics or logic might be justified, since the 
constraints of grammar vary from community to community and owe something to 
linguistic experience in the communities where they contingently hold, whereas the truths 
of mathematics and logic are universal and (under many philosophers’ views) are 
necessary and a priori, and might be said to owe nothing to experience. 
I take grammatical truths to be statable in terms of simple conditions on the 
structure of expressions, like the ones in [9], which can be stated as very simple first-
order logic formulae — though here I give just an English paraphrase: 
[9] a. An imperative clause has its verb in the plain form. 
 b. Every adjective phrase has an adjective head. 
 c. Every independent clause is finite. 
 d. The head verb of a clause with a primary verb form agrees in person and 
number with the subject. 
 e. A pronoun that functions as subject in a finite clause takes the nominative 
case form. 
Such statements are not evaluative; they are simple assertions about structure. 
Interpreted on some structures they will be true; on others they will be false. Yet in a 
sense they can also be seen as being in one-to-one correspondence with related 
statements about right courses of action. Thus ([constraints]a) says simply that imperative 
clauses have plain-form verbs, but it is related to a statement like “The right kind of 
imperative clause to use (if you want to be regarded as speaking English) is one that has 
its verb inflected in the plain form.” 
The grammarian’s task is to devise a finite set of non-evaluative statements about 
structure such that a structure will satisfy all of the statements if and only if an 
evaluative judgment of it as well-formed would be correct. This can be done to any 
desired degree of precision, using any mathematical or logical tools that enhance 
explicitness and make consequences clearer. 
Sampson, then, is wildly off beam when he claims I contradict myself: 
Then, a page or two later, Pullum urges that grammarians need to become “a lot more 
conversant with ways of mathematicizing their subject matter”, blithely ignoring the conflict 
between that recommendation and the appeal to treat linguistics as a discipline concerned 
with norms. The gulf between formal mathematical discourse, and discourse about norms, is 
about as wide as any chasm in the map of learning. (Sampson 2007a: 112) 
This is an extraordinary misrepresentation. What I actually said was on a different topic, 
nothing to do with the normativity of the subject matter; it was this: 
It is strange for us to find ourselves unable to agree on whether essentially all strings of 
words are grammatical or essentially none are. This is not a happy state for the discourse in 
linguistics to be in. And it is not going to improve until syntacticians get a lot more 
conversant with ways of mathematicizing their subject matter—both the application of 
statistics to corpora and the use of logic and algebra to formalize claims about grammatical 
constraints. (Pullum 2007:43) 
This empirical prediction—that discourse in linguistics will remain confusing until 
linguists are more familiar with mathematical tools and techniques—could not 
conceivably be read as conflicting with the claim that some expressions are well-formed 
and others are not, which is all that normativity with respect to language amounts to. 
The mathematical tools I had primarily in mind, incidentally, are those of logic, and 
specifically model theory. A set of constraints on syntactic form can be framed in a 
formalized logical language interpreted on structures that idealize the structural properties 
of the expressions in the language under description (Pullum 2013). But Sampson just 
speculates a bit about how there might be some kind of mathematicizing of a utilitarian 
calculus in ethics, and then drops the subject as too obscure to explore: 
[I]t seems clear that Pullum is opening up a range of methodological ideas more diverse than 
anything I suggested, and is adumbrating them too briefly for me to feel obliged to take them 
on board. (Sampson 2007b:113) 
But it is really not that hard to grasp what I am suggesting. The following are the main 
ideas: 
[10] Central ideas about grammar and its evidential support 
 [i] Grammars are sets of statements about structural properties; 
[ii] if an expression has all the properties the grammar stipulates then it is well-
formed according to that grammar; 
[iii] if an expression lacks any of the properties the grammar stipulates, then it is 
ill-formed according to that grammar; 
[iv] a proposed formulation of a rule or an entire grammar may be inaccurate; 
[v] the aim of the descriptive grammarian is to write a grammar that is not 
inaccurate; 
[vi] under ideal circumstances for those who know the language (and 
circumstances are often not ideal) short and simple sentences will often be 
judged grammatical iff they are indeed well-formed; 
[vii] under ideal circumstances (and circumstances are often not ideal) accurate 
transcriptions of what individual speakers said or what individual writers 
wrote will be composed mainly of sentences that are indeed well-formed. 
The parallels with the moral domain are actually quite striking, I think. I exhibit a 
few comparisons in Table 3. 
  LINGUISTIC DOMAIN   MORAL DOMAIN 
  Judgment of grammaticality Judgment that an act is right 
  Judgment of ungrammaticality Judgment that an act is wrong 
  Grammatical constraint  Explicitly stated moral precept 
  Construction of grammars  Codification of moral principles 
  Formalized grammars  Rigorously stated codifications 
  Universal grammar   Meta-ethics 
  Usage advice    Casuistry (advice-giving about morality) 
  Prescriptive bullying   Moral preachiness 
  Problematic usage points  Controversial moral questions 
  Corpora    Records of morally relevant behaviour 
  Descriptive grammar  Moral anthropology 
Table 3: Parallels between linguistic and moral domains 
The most salient point on which the analogy between the two domains obviously 
breaks down is the appropriacy of relativism. In morality, most philosophers consider 
relativism (the idea that something may be wrong for you but not for someone else) is 
anathema. For one thing, it undercuts itself (consider what a relativist has to say about the 
claim “It is right to assume relativism”). Grammar, on the other hand, is radically and 
unavoidably relativistic: just because putting the verb at the beginning of the VP is 
grammatically correct in English doesn’t make it right in Japanese. 
But the way in which we might establish and justify our beliefs in the moral domain 
bears a fair similarity to what we might want to maintain in the grammatical domain. 
Scanlon (2002:149) describes Goodman’s method of reflective equilibrium as “the only 
defensible method of making up one’s mind about moral matters and about many other 
subjects.” What I am suggesting is not (of course) that truths about English or German 
syntax are a priori and necessary like the truths of morality in the view of moral realists, 
but that in the empirical discipline of linguistics a very similar methodological approach 
provides the best reconstruction of the epistemology of the subject. 
For an instructive recent example of the way reflective equilibrium works in ethics, 
see Swinburne (2015:628ff). The way it works in syntax is essentially that we go back 
and forth between checking data and improving theory. We tentatively accept specific 
judgments, like (for example) that example [4] is grammatical, and attempt to make them 
fit broader patterns of regular structure by positing general syntactic principles that 
explain the tentative grammaticality judgments. 
If we find the general principles predict incorrectly about our judgments on other 
sentences, naturally we reconsider the general principles. If we find a general principle is 
too well confirmed for it to be lightly rejected, we turn back to consider the possibility 
that some of our judgments are mistaken. Going back and forth in this way, we seek an 
optimal fit between elegant general statements of syntactic principles and the facts of a 
broad array of specific judgments on sentences. 
Missing here is any reference to corpora. Linguistics derives its claim to be 
empirical from the close fit between behaviour and grammatical constraints (not a 
relevant consideration in the moral domain). It would be irrational not to assume that 
well-confirmed regularities in actual language use point the way toward what general 
statements should be in the grammar (this is why the “nothing is relevant” view is 
stupid). What is needed for grammar is a triangular version of reflective equilibrium, 
involving linguistic behaviour (corpora), general constraints (grammars), and intuitive 
assessment of well-formedness (judgments). None of these is to be dismissed—yet 
crucially, none is sovereign. 
We start with simple cases on which we regard our grammaticality judgments as 
clearly trustworthy. We formulate general statements about the structure of these clear 
cases, test the predictive power of the general statements, and revise them if they 
mispredict either judgments or corpus facts. 
If judgments and general principles are firmly in conflict with the corpus on some 
point, we may decide that the corpus contains an error (thought spelled as though or 
whatever). If judgments and corpora both agree on a range of cases that are in conflict 
with general statements of syntax, we consider revising those statements. And so on as 
we journey toward optimal fit. 
This looks more like an epistemology for syntax. It rejects both the crazy 
assumption that native speakers cannot err and the irrational claim that evidence of use 
cannot bear on the justification of grammatical constraints. It is reasonably sensible, and 
located in some the large area that the erratic pendulum of methodological fashion 
traverses as it swings. 
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